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We reexamine the analysis of Barrett (2001), that explores the size of a self-enforcing
international environmental agreements. Barrett stresses that the key feature to realize the
self-enforcing agreement is asymmetries among countries, but we get the following results;
certain condition that usually does not hold is required for the Barrett's solution, so it is
necessary to reconsider the model settings.
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The purpose of this article is to reexamine the analysis of Barrett (2001), which inves-
tigates the size of a self-enforcing international environmental agreement by considering
asymmetries among countries. Earlier studies by Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), Barrett
(1994) and others have shown that size of the self-enforcing agreement is typically very
small. In these models, countries are assumed to make desisions simultaneously. Barrett
(2001), however, shows when there is strong asymmetry among countries, the rule of the
game changes so that countries that gain much from the agreement (developed countries)
ﬁrst make decisions to join an agreement and then oﬀer side payments to countries that
gain less (developing countries) to let them sign in. This change would expand the size
of self-enforcing agreement substantially, thus Barrett (2001) insists that the key factor
for self-enforcing agreements is asymmetries among countries. He also examines the cost-
sharing rule belonging to the core proposed by Chander and Tulkens (1997) and points
out that the Chander-Tulkens rule would not be eﬀective without a rather unrealistic as-
sumption that the agreement is terminated once a country withdraws from the agreement.
Moreover, he stresses that his theory is consistent with what actually happened through
the process of conclusion of the Montereal Protocol.
Although the analysis of Barrett (2001) is quite appealing and highly suggestive, it
seems that the derivation of the equilibrium has not been suﬃciently described in the
paper. Therefore we attempt to reexamine his analysis rigorously. Unfortunately we get
the following negative results; certain condition that usually does not hold is required for
the most essential part of Barrett’s solution, so it is necessary to reconsider the model
settings. In Section 2, we brieﬂy introduce the Barrett model and the solution of the
model when side payments are not allowed. Section 3 is devoted to description of the
solution after the change of the rules. Section 4 provides a summary.
2 Equilibria in the basic model
We describe a game of international cooperation on the pollution abatement formulated in
Barrett (2001). Countries sharing the same environment are players. Let us assume that
there are two types of countries, and let Ni denote the number of type i countries (i =1 ,2).
The game consists of two stages. In the ﬁrst stage each country decides simultaneously
whether to be a signatory to the agreement or not. In the second stage the actions of
signatories are chosen so that they maximize the total payoﬀ of the signatories; whereas
each non-signatory behaves noncooperatively. It is assumed that there is at most one
agreement at the same time.
There are only two actions to be chosen in the second stage: “Pollute” and “Abate.”
When type i countries play Pollute and Abate they get payoﬀ of αi(b1z1 + b2z2) and
−c+αi(b1z1+b2z2) respectively, where zi is the number of type i countries playing Abate
and c is the abatement cost which does not depend on the country type. In addition,
1α2 =1>α 1 > 0, and b2 >b 1 > 0.1 In the context of environmental issues such as ozone
depletion, we can regard type 1 and type 2 players as developing and developed countries,
respectively. In order to set the second stage as a “prisoner’s dilemma” situation when
all countries behave noncooperatively, assumptions c>b 2, and α1N1 + N2 > c/b1 are
imposed.
First, equilibrium of the second stage is derived. It is clear that non-signatory countries
play Pollute. When the number of type i signatory countries is denoted as ki, equilibrium
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Barrett (2001, p. 1840) derives the same equilibria. Here, a certain degree of diﬀerence
between the values of b1 and b2 are assumed.2 When there are strong asymmetries, it is
diﬃcult for (2a) type equilibrium to exist and thus only (2b) type is possible. In other
words, a self-enforcing agreement consists of type 2 countries only.
3 Equilibria after changes in rules
As described, in the case where countries are strongly asymmetric so that only (2b) type
equilibrium exists, type 1 countries do not have an incentive to become a signatory. The
rule is then changed as follows: type 2 countries ﬁrst decide whether to become a signatory
and then the signatories oﬀer side payment to type 1 countries to let them to accede. This
game consists of three stages. In the ﬁrst stage, type 2 countries decide whether to accede
to the agreement. In the second stage, these countries discuss and choose actions and the
amount of side payment m for type 1 countries which commit to accession and playing
Abate. Then in the third stage, type 1 countries decide whether to be signatories by
considering the oﬀer from type 2 countries. Lastly both types of non-signatories decide
their actions, but it is clear that all play Pollute.
1Barrett (2001) assumes α2 =1≥ α1 > 0, and b2 ≥ b1 > 0, but we have changed the assumption
slightly. The eﬀect of this change is negligible.
2This solution is derived by using a similar method to one described in Section 3, but the details are
not explained here. Barrett (2001) shows that there is another equilibrium which realizes the agreement
with both types of countries when b1 ≈ b2 and α1 ≈ 1, that is, only a weak asymmetry is present. We
do not show it because it is not directly related to this article.
2We use suﬃx “∗∗” to denote the equilibria of this game. When the number of type 2















































In the ﬁrst stage, k∗∗
2 is determined to complete the solution. Barrett (2001) does not
clearly describe how to derive the solution of the ﬁrst stage, but it would be necessary to
examine various cases based on the magnitude relation between k2 and c/b2, or between
k2 and c/b1 − α1, and so on.
A set of one-dimensional positive real numbers is divided into three regions: (0,c/b2),
[c/b2,c/b1 − α1),[c/b1 − α1,∞), and each region is called region 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
When the value of k2 is within the region 1, type 2 countries play Pollute and also
cooperation of type 1 countries is not available because side payment is not oﬀered as
shown in (3a). In region 2, (3b) holds, which means type 2 countries play Abate but side
payment for type 1 countries is not oﬀered. In region 3, (3c) holds, so type 2 countries
play Abate and the additional cooperation of type 1 countries is available due to side
payment c − α1b1.
Next let us deﬁne the self-enforcing agreement following Carraro and Siniscalco (1993).
Factors which aﬀect payoﬀ of a type 2 country are number of signatories (the number of
countries playing Abate depends on the number of signatories) and whether a country
is a signatory or not. Let payoﬀ of a type 2 signatory and non-signatory be denoted by
πS(k2) and πN(k2) respectively, when the size of an agreement is k2. When
πS(k2) >π N(k2 − 1) (4)
holds, the agreement is deﬁned to have internal stability or as internally stable. Also when
πN(k2) ≥ πS(k2 + 1) (5)
holds, the agreement is deﬁned to have external stability or as externally stable. (4) means
that the payoﬀ of a signatory decreases when that country defects from agreement. (5)
means that the payoﬀ of a non-signatory does not increase by acceding to the agreement.
When these conditions are met, the agreement can be judged as self-enforcing.4 It is also
clear that this self-enforcing agreement is consistent with the Nash equilibrium of a game
dealing with the accession to an agreement.
3See (10a)-(10c) in Barrett (2001, p. 1843).
4It is assumed that each country does not accede when it is indiﬀerent between being a signatory or
a non-signatory.
3Now we evaluate the situations where both internal stability and external stability
hold. For internal stability, ﬁve cases shown in Table 1 can be considered according to
the location of k2 and k2 − 1.
Table 1 Internal stability
Case k2 k2 − 1 Beneﬁt of defection Cost of defection Internal stability
1 region 1 region 1 00 no
2 region 2 region 1 cb 2k2 yes (for k2  = c/b2)
3 region 2 region 2 cb 2 no
4 region 3 region 2 c + N1(c − α1b1)/k2 b1N1 + b2 normally no
5 region 3 region 3 c + N1(c − α1b1)/k2 b2 no
Let us explain the rationale for Table 1. Note that there is a suﬃcient distance between
region 1 and region 3, so the case where k2 belongs to region 3 while k2 − 1 belongs to
region 1 is not considered. In case 1, all signatories play Pollute, so beneﬁt and cost of
defection from the agreement are both zero, which means (4) does not hold5 and thus
the agreement is not internally stable. In case 2, signatories play Abate, therefore beneﬁt
of defecting from the agreement is c and cost becomes b2k2, because all k2 countries
including the defecting country stop abatement. In this case, since k2 ≥ c/b2, that is,
b2k2 ≥ c, beneﬁt is never greater than cost. Therefore, the agreement is internally stable
except when k2 = c/b2. In case 3, should a signatory defect from the agreement, other
signatory countries would continue to play Abate, so cost of defection is only b2 and
beneﬁt is c. From the assumption, c>b 2. In case 4, beneﬁt of defection is the sum
of abatement cost and contribution for the side payment to type 1 countries, which is
c + N1(c − αb1)/k2.6 Meanwhile cost is calculated as b1N1 + b2 by adding b1N1, which is
due to loss of cooperation by type 1 countries, to b2. In this case, which of beneﬁt or cost is
greater depends on the parameter values. In case 4, k2 is located near boundary between
the regions 2 and 3, so we get k2 ≈ c/b1−α1 and thus c+N1(c−α1b1)/k2−(b1N1+b2) ≈
c − b2 > 0 by simple calculation. Therefore, normally this agreement cannot be regarded
as internally stable. In case 5, beneﬁt of defection is the same as case 4 and cost is b2,
the same as case 3, so it is clear that the agreement is not internally stable.
For the external stability, cases can be divided into the following two cases depending
on the location of k2 and k2 + 1. The results are described in Table 2.
Table 2 External stability
Case k2 k2 +1 Beneﬁt of accession Cost of accession External stability
6 region 2 region 2 b2 c yes




5In this case, πN(k2 − 1) − πS(k2)=0 .
6All type 2 signatories are assumed to bear equal side payment. If other payment rules are applied,
the maximum value of beneﬁt of defection would be greater.
4According to previous analyses, it is not necessary to consider the case where k2 is located
in region 1. Moreover, when k2 belongs to region 2, internal stability holds only when
k2 − 1 belongs to region 1, therefore the assumption previously made for region 1 and
region 3 eliminates the case where k2+1 is in the region 3. Derivations of cost and beneﬁt
are almost the same as in the case of internal stability, so we do not explain them here.
To summarize, as the equilibrium number of each type of signatories the following two





































which corresponds to cases 4 and 7. Inequalities in the parentheses of (6a) and (6b) are
conditions for k2 ≤ N2 to exist in region 2 and 3, respectively. (6a) and (6b) are almost
the same as those derived in Section 6 of Barrett (2001),7 and Barrett insists that (6b) is
the preferred type of equilibrium obtained through the change in the rule.
However, we should pay attention to the condition for the existence of (6b) type
equilibrium:
c + N1(c − α1b1)/k2 − (b1N1 + b2) ≤ 0. (7)
Let us see whether (7) holds using a numerical example. As in an example of Barrett
(2001), let N1 = N2 =5 0 ,c= 100,b 1 =3 ,b 2 = 6 and α1 =0 .5. In this case, Barrett shows
the existence of an equilibrium of k∗∗
1 = 50 and k∗∗
2 = 33, but it is not an equilibrium,
because (7) does not hold. Payoﬀs of type 2 countries before and after defecting from the
agreement are actually calculated as πS(33) = 98.8 and πN(32) = 192 respectively, which
means payoﬀ after defection increases substantially. In order for (7) to hold, parameter
b2 must be greater than 99.24. We have b2 <c= 100, so the value of b2 is only within
very narrow range. Considering the change of paremater N1, (7) holds when N1 is greater
than 6204, but this is obviously unrealistic.
Additionally, if we ﬁx b1,b 2 and α1, (7) tends to hold when c is smaller, as well as
when N1 is larger. A smaller c leads to a smaller beneﬁt of free-riding, and a larger N1
means higher eﬀects of side payment. But in this case, c/α1b1 <N 1 is satisﬁed and thus
the assumption of strong asymmetries does not hold any longer.
4 Summary
We get the result that the equilibrium practically does not change, even though the rule
is changed so that the speciﬁc types of countries ﬁrst decide whether to be signatories.
7Actually, the condition N2 < c/b1 − α1 is included to (6a) in Barrett (2001).
5In other words, Barrett’s (2001) argument that the asymmetries are the key to a larger
self-enforcing agreement is questionable, therefore ﬁnding other factors is necessary.
As a matter of fact, success in the Montreal Protocol might be considered to be
attributable to the presence of incentives of every single developed country, as explained
by Barrett himself (in other words, b2 ≥ c holds in the model).8 As a political measure
to expand the self-enforcing agreement, the side payment rule proposed by Chander and
Tulkens (1997) criticized by Barrett seems to be worth reconsidering.
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